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- OLIVER M. CLEGG
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REVIEW OP RECENT COURT DECISIONS
AFFECTING THE OIL AND GAS INDUSTRY
I have revised the subject topic as shown in the program to add the
word "recent", so that it reads, "Review of Recent Court Decisions
Affecting the Oil and Gas Industry.”

The title shown in the program is

somewhat open-ended and reminds me of a recent "decision” of Judge
George Rose Smith of our Supreme Court.

The litigation began as a

simple suit In ejectment, but the defendant entered a very novel and
sweeping defense, citing an act of the previous Legislature providing:
"All laws and parts of laws are hereby repealed."

As you know, it is

customary for legislative acts to include a repealing clause In the
standard language:

"All laws or parts of laws in conflict herewith are

hereby repealed."

Apparently, in its haste to adjourn or to do something

else, the Legislature In one instance had omitted the words "in conflict
herewith."

Acceding to the recent clamor that Courts stop usurping

Legislatures, Mr. Justice Smith held that the language of the statute was
plain; that the Court was bound to carry out the legislative intent; and
that its effect was simply to repeal all of the statutory and case law in
the State of Arkansas.

Needless to say, there was great consternation

among the bench and bar until someone remembered that the day the opinion
was rendered was April 1.

Then someone else, having some knowledge of

French, recognized that the style of the case, "Poisson v. D ’A v ril",
means "Fish of April", or, in our idiom, April Fool!

In looking back through past volumes of the Institute proceedings,
for which we are all deeply indebted to Murphy Oil Corporation, I notice
that the topic, "Recent Developments in Oil and Gas Law” , has become an
annual one, and in fact, at one Institute, there were two talks having
that identical subject, back to back.
The format of this presentation generally has assumed a reference
to the recent Arkansas decisions and then some comments on recent decisions
from other jurisdictions.
During 1971, the Arkansas Supreme Court decided only one case of
special interest in the mineral field, Helms v. Vaughn, 250 Ark. 828,
457 S.W.2d 399.

Two brothers had acquired a royalty interest in 1947.

On December 27, 1963, one of the partners executed an instrument styled
"Release", by which he purported to "release, remise, relinquish, and
surrender all of his right, title and interest in" the royalty, etc.
Suit was filed by the landowners claiming that the interest released
vested in them.

The Court held, however, that since there was no

grantee named in the deed, it was void for want of a necessary party and
further that there was no abandonment, since minerals in place constitute
real property and can only be relinquished in circumstances of estoppel
or adverse possession.

Since there was no evidence of any reliance by

the land owners upon the alleged abandonment so as to create an estoppel
nor evidence of adverse possession, the Court found that the deed was
a nullity and title was quieted in the defendants.
While the opinion does not so state, it is possible that the
mineral owner executed the instrument in question for the purpose of
-
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establishing a tax loss and that when the minerals later became valuable,
he changed his mind about disposing of them.

However, it is not the tax

consequences that interest us at the moment, but rather the statement by
the Court of the technical requirements

of conveyancing, "including the

necessity for a grantee in a deed for it to be operative and the basic
rule that title to minerals in place cannot be lost by abandonment, except
where the elements of estoppel or the statute of limitations are present.
The other Arkansas case of interest decided in 1971 is Mining
Corporation of Arkansas v. International Paper Company, 324 F .Supp. 705.
The case was tried to Senior District Judge John E. Miller, surely one
of the outstanding jurists in all of the history of the State of
Arkansas.
The question was whether cinnabar, or mercury, was included in a
1911 reservation of "all minerals, coal, oil, or gas."

The mother case

in this field is Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Strohacker, 202
Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557.

For a complete discussion of the Strohacker

case and the subsequent decisions, see "Strohacker Revisited - a Problem
in Mineral Conveyancing", 1st Annual Arkansas Oil and Gas Institute
(1962).

Briefly, the question presented in the Strohacker line of cases

is what specific minerals are included in the general term "minerals."
Judge Miller aptly summed up the ruling of the cases that the
term "minerals" only includes "those minerals known to exist in the
general area of the land embraced in the deed at that time.

The factual

question of whether cinnabar was a mineral known to be present in Clark
County in 1911 was decided upon governmental reports, clearly proving that
cinnabar, or mercury, was first discovered in Arkansas in about 1930 or 1933

Because of the Strohac ker rule, which oftentimes defeats the real
intent of the parties, a broad form of reservation has been devised and
is in limited use in South Arkansas.

While it is not perfect and should

always be used in the light of each given situation, it is usually in
the following language:
"The grantors except from this conveyance and reserve
unto themselves, their heirs and assigns, all of the oil, gas,
distillate, condensate, iron, bauxite, copper, zinc, tin, barite,
gold, silver, silica, salt water, and all other minerals, whether
like or unlike those described, including all substances which
are not now, but which may in the future be classified as
minerals, together with the right of ingress and egress for
the purpose of mining, exploring for, producing, saving, transporting, and marketing any of the aforesaid minerals."
The Strohacker question has arisen in South Arkansas in recent

years in connection with the production of bromine from salt water.
For a discussion of those problems, see "Legal Aspects Relative to
Bromine," 8th Annual Oil & Gas Institute, 1969.
A variation of the Strohacker problem was presented last year to
the Supreme Court of Texas in A c ker v. Guinn,

Involved was a 1941 deed

conveying "an undivided one-half interest in and to all of the oil, gas
and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from" a tract
in Cherokee County, Texas.

The question was whether the grant included

an interest in a surface deposit of iron ore.

The Court, in effect,

rejected the reasoning of the Strohacker case and approved the reasoning
°f Professor Kuntz in his article, "The Law Relating to Oil and Gas in
Wyoming", 3 Wyom. Law. Rev. 107.

Professor Kuntz had suggested that

the courts were mistakenly attempting to discover and give effect to an
intention to include or exclude a specific substance from the grant or

reservation.

Rather, he said:

”The intention sought should be the general intent, rather than any
s u p p o s e d , but unexpressed, specific intent, and, further, that
general intent should be arrived at, not by defining and re-defining
the terms u s e d , but by considering the purposes of the grant or
reservation i n terms of manner of enjoyment intended in the ensuing
interests."
He then sets out the general approach to be made:
"When a general grant or reservation is made of all minerals without
qualifying language, it should be reasonably assumed that the parties
intended to sever the entire mineral estate from the surface estate,
leaving the owner of each with definite incidence of ownership
enjoyable in distinctly different manners.

The manner of enjoy-

ment of the mineral estate is through extraction of valuable subatances, and the enjoyment of the surface is through the retention
of such substances as are necessary for the use of the surface, and
these respective modes of enjoyment must be considered in arriving
at the proper subject matter for each estate."
The Texas Court, following Professor K u n t z 's reasoning,

concluded:
"Unless the contrary intention is affimat i v e l y and fairly
expressed, therefore, a grant or reservation of 'minerals'
or 'mineral rights’ should not be construed to include a substance
that must be removed by methods that w i l l , in effect, consume or
deplete the surface estate."

The Supreme Court of Texas referred to Carson v , Missouri Pacific
Railroad Co., 2 1 2 Ark. 963, 209 S.W.2d 97, where the Arkansas Court held
that bauxite was not included in a 1892 reservation of "all coal and
mineral deposits", because "(1) bauxite is a clay formation containing
alumina in small particles;

(2) its existence was not known at the time

the instrument was executed; and (3) the mining of bauxite is generally
by the open pit method, which would destroy the value of the estate."
It would therefore seem that Arkansas has, in effect, recognized
both rules and the question now arises as to what approach the Supreme
Court will take when next confronted with this question.

The Court’s

reluctance to disturb what it sometimes calls "Rules of Property" may be
a deterent, but it would certainly seem that the better rule is that
advanced by Professor Kuntz.
One of the most interesting decisions of 1971 was Jolly v. Wilson,

278 Pac.2d 886.

In that Oklahoma case the reservation in a deed was:

"However, there is reserved and excepted from this conveyance,
one-half of one-eighth of all minerals in and under said land, the
same being reserved and excepted, and said royalty is nonparticipating
in the lease or lease rentals."
The Court applied the rule that where a reservation contained characteristics
of both a mineral and a royalty interest, It will be construed to reserve
that interest whose characteristics are more clearly described, a n d , it
said, the language "minerals in and under" the land clearly indicated a
mineral interest and overcame the provision "said royalty is nonparticipating In the lease or delay rentals", particularly where there was
standing oil and gas lease.

out-

The Court adopted the approach that the

elements of ownership of minerals as opposed to the elements of ownership

of royalty furnish a key to the proper construction of the language and
thus the intent of the parties.

As a preliminary to this discussion the

court pointed out a summary of factors to be considered in distinguishing
whether a mineral or royalty interest reservation is made from 9 Okla.
Law Rev. 139 as follows:
"(1)
If the interest conveyed or retained is of the oil and
gas in and under the land, a mineral interest is indicated. On
the other hand, if the interest conveyed is in oil and gas to be
produced, a royalty interest may be the result.
"(2 ) Who has the right to grant leases, and to receive bonuses
and rentals? If it is the grantee of the interest, a mineral
interest is created.
If not, a royalty or nonparticipating mineral
interest may be the result.
"(3) If the right of ingress and egress and of exploration is
granted, the interest conveyed is mineral not royalty.
”(4) If there is an oil and gas lease in existence at the time
the deed is made, the word ’royalty’ when used to describe the
interest reserved or conveyed, is usually interpreted to mean
royalty in the restricted sense as a share in production only; but,
in the absence of an existing lease, ’royalty’ is likely to be
interpreted in its loose, broad sense to mean a mineral interest.
”(5) If the interest conveyed or retained is 'royalty' in
its restricted sense, the fractional designation of the quantum of
interest usually refers to that fractional part of the gross
production.
If the Interest is 'mineral' the fractional designation
of the quantum conveyed or retained usually entitled the grantee to
only that fractional part of the lessor's share of production.”
I have copied the summary because it may be of some assistance as a
guide to whether a particular reservation or grant is of minerals or
royalty.
The Oklahoma Court placed great emphasis upon the fact that the
reservation used the language "minerals in and under the land."

That

language, clearly indicating a mineral estate, was sufficient to overcome
what the Court said was ambiguous language, "said royalty is
-
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nonparticipating in the lease or lease rentals.”
use of t h e
and n e v e r

The Court said that the

term "royalty" was weakened by the fact that the land was not
had been under lease.

It disposed of the statement that the

interest w a s nonparticipating in "the lease or lease rentals" by saying
that t h e

parties could have meant that the owner of the interest would

not p a r t i c i p a t e in the lease bonus and lease rentals without regard to
the e x e c u t i v e right or the necessity to execute the lease.
I am
Language
formal,

inclined to disagree with the holding of the Court.

The

"minerals in and under said lands" is more often used as a
legalistic expression.

It seems to me that the real intent

of the p a r t i e s is better arrived at by looking at the specific and
unusual language which they use, rather than legal formalities.

To me,

one of t h e most significant keys to the intent of the parties is the fact
that t h e y

reserved "one-half of one-eighth."

to the u s u a l

This is clearly a reference

one-eighth royalty provided in leases.

If the parties had

m erely i n t e n d e d to reserve a one-sixteenth of the oil, gas and minerals
in place,

as the Court held, they would normally have expressed it in

One f r a c t i o n ,
fraction.

"one-sixteenth", rather than expressing it in a double

c f . Longino v. Machen

(1950) 217 Ark. 64l, 232 S.W.2d 826.

Furthermore, the use of the term "said royalty" is an express
description by the parties of the interest with which they are dealing.
wo r d

"nonparticipating", however hazy its origins may be, has come to

a recognized meaning, and is certainly consistent with the use of
t he word
O il & G a s

"royalty."

See "Non-Participating Royalty", 5th Annual Ark.

I nstitute (1966).
-
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While it is technically true that the executive rights may be
separated from rights to participate in bonus and rentals, as a
practical matter, this is not a desirable situation.

If, as the Court

holds, the owner of this reserved interest is not entitled to participate
in the lease bonus, but is required to sign the lease, those of you who
have had some experience in getting leases signed by parties who will not
receive any money will immediately recognize the practical problem.

Thus,

the Oklahoma Court held that instead of being entitled to one-half of the
one-eighth royalty under any future lease, "nonparticipating", the grantor
had a one-sixteenth mineral interest which, when leased, would entitle
him to 1/128 of the production as a royalty, rather than 1 / 1 6 , without
participation in the bonus or rentals, but with the necessity for
executing the lease.

In other words, if the interest owner is not

entitled to participate in the lease bonus, it is inconsistent to say that
he is a necessary party to the lease; and if he is not a necessary party
t0 the lease, then It is inconsistent to say that the interest he owns is
a mineral interest.

It is submitted that the decision of the Court is based

upon the use of technical rules of construction, rather than special
language the parties purposely used to describe the Interest they were
attempting to create.
One other case decided in 1971 should be mentioned, It also being
a decision of the Oklahoma Supreme Court.

In Beaton v. Pure Oil Co. ,

463 Pac.2d 1145, four grantors who collectively owned the full mineral
fee made a deed containing a warranty clause which undertook to convey
"an undivided__________interest" In forty acres.

The lower Court held

that the deed conveyed the entire mineral interest of the grantors.
The Court of Appeals held the existence of the word "undivided"
suggested something less than all, and that the blank created an
ambiguity that could be resolved by extrinsic, parol evidence and that
since such evidence could not be introduced because of the Statute of
Frauds, the deed was therefore void.

The Supreme Court affirmed the

first decision, holding that the deed conveyed all of the interest of
the grantors, relying heavily upon an Oklahoma statute, 16 O.S. 1961, §19,
that a warranty deed conveyed to the grantee the entire interest of the
grantor.

While Arkansas does not have a statute identical to that of

Oklahoma, there has long been case law to the same effect.

In Patterson

v. Miller, 154 Ark. 124, 24l S.W. 875, the Arkansas Court said:
"There is a presumption, of course, that a grantor intends to
convey his entire interest by his deed, and such is the effect of
the deed which does not limit the interest conveyed."
A harder case, of course, would be made if the grantor owned less than
the full mineral fee and purported to convey "an undivided _________
interest" in oil, gas and minerals.

That, of course, differs from a deed

conveying "my undivided _______ interest."

I have not found any direct

authority, but I would be inclined to think that, particularly if a
printed form were used, and the language was "an undivided ______

.

interest", the Court should treat that as ambiguous or imcomplete and
permit the introduction of parol testimony to determine what interest
was intended to be conveyed.

Usually, of course, there are other keys

in the instrument, such as the common expression of an intention to convey

-10

a certain number of mineral or royalty acres.
I appreciate-the honor of this traditional task of mentioning some
of the recent decisions, and I look forward with you to another instructive

and enjoyable Institute.

-
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